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ABSTRACT—While thirty-two states in the United States still authorize
capital punishment, this country finds itself in the midst of an undisputed
trend towards states outlawing the death penalty. Over the past six years,
legislatures in six states have abolished capital punishment—breaking a
three-decade-long death penalty reform stalemate. Although anti-death
penalty advocates have fought to abolish capital punishment in the United
States for over two centuries, their successes were fairly minimal until
recently. What accounts for the anti-death penalty movement’s recent
success? This Note argues that “interest-convergence,” a theory developed
by Professor Derrick Bell, provides one important explanation. Within the
past decade, anti-death penalty advocates have placed less emphasis on the
moral arguments against capital punishment, focusing more on the costs
and inefficiencies of the practice. In turn, state legislatures have been
receptive to the anti-death penalty movement’s cost arguments, especially
in light of the recent economic crisis. In other words, by giving state
legislatures a self-interested reason to abolish capital punishment—saving
their constituents millions of dollars (and increasing their chances of
reelection)—anti-death penalty advocates have aligned state lawmakers’
interests with their own. The result has been an apparent turning point for
death penalty reform in America.
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INTRODUCTION
While thirty-two states in the United States still authorize capital
punishment, this country finds itself in the midst of an undisputed trend
towards states outlawing the death penalty.1 When New Jersey’s legislature
repealed the state’s capital punishment statute in 2007, it became the first
state legislature to abolish the death penalty since 1976.2 Over the past six
years, five other state legislatures have followed suit.3 Although anti-death
penalty advocates have fought to abolish capital punishment in the United
States for over two centuries, their successes were fairly minimal until
recently. What accounts for the anti-death penalty movement’s recent
1

See Valerie Richardson, States Slowly Killing Capital Punishment, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2012,
at A01 (“The death penalty, already on the decline across the United States, could face its own demise
at the hands of several state legislatures next year.”); States With and Without the Death Penalty,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (DPIC), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-deathpenalty (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); The Death Penalty: Another Reprieve, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 2012,
at 44 (describing Connecticut’s repeal of capital punishment as “part of a growing trend”); US:
Momentum Against the Death Penalty, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2012/04/12/us-momentum-against-death-penalty (stating that “the momentum against the death
penalty [in the United States] is gaining force”).
2
Robert J. Martin, Killing Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The First State in Modern History to
Repeal Its Death Penalty Statute, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 485, 485 (2010).
3
Since 2007, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico, Illinois, Connecticut, and Maryland have
abolished the death penalty. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 1.
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success? This Note attempts to provide an answer to this question and
concludes that one partial explanation is a straightforward one: interestconvergence.
For decades, the anti-death penalty movement suffered from “too few
members, too little money, and too little broad appeal in the messages the
movement has tried to deliver.”4 Over the past twenty years, however, the
anti-death penalty movement’s strategy has shifted away from fighting the
death penalty solely on moral grounds. Although anti-death penalty
advocates continue to argue that the death penalty is morally wrong, within
the past decade advocacy organizations have increasingly advanced
economic rationales for opposing death sentences. Specifically, they argue
that because capital punishment is irrationally expensive and ineffective, it
wastes money and steals resources from other state needs. In other words,
the opportunity costs of the death penalty are too great.
In turn, state legislatures, still coming to grips with the wake of the
recent financial crisis, have proved receptive to the anti-death penalty
movement’s cost arguments. In statements supporting the abolition of the
death penalty, many state lawmakers have pointed to the high costs of
capital punishment.5 In fact, it has been recognized that cost was an
important factor behind the legislatures’ decisions to abolish the death
penalty in New Jersey and New Mexico.6
As this Note illustrates, in addition to New Jersey and New Mexico,
cost played a major role in the abolition of capital punishment in Illinois,
Connecticut, and Maryland. Cost has also influenced lawmakers in several
other states to introduce death penalty repeal bills that eliminate capital
punishment as a sentencing possibility. More importantly, however, this
Note argues that the success of the cost argument did not occur entirely by
happenstance, as others have suggested.7 Rather, its success resulted from a
deliberate effort by anti-death penalty advocates throughout the country to
bring economic arguments to the public’s attention.

4

HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT
5 (1996).
5
See, e.g., N.J. SENATE BUDGET APPROPRIATIONS COMM., STATEMENT TO SENATE COMMITTEE
SUBSTITUTE FOR SENATE, NOS. 171 AND 2471, at 3 (2007), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
2006/Bills/S0500/171_S2.PDF; Carolyn McGinn, McGinn: Abolishing Death Penalty Way to Go, THE
KANSAN (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.thekansan.com/article/20090227/NEWS/302279966#art-tit
(stating that overturning the death penalty would save Kansas “more than $500,000 per case”); Press
Release, Senator Loni Hancock, Hancock to Introduce Legislation to Ban Death Penalty (June 20,
2011),
http://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/2011-06-21-hancock-introduce-legislation-ban-death-penalty
(stating that “capital punishment is an expensive failure” that “is helping to bankrupt us”).
6
See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration
Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 161.
7
See, e.g., id.; Rob Warden, How and Why Illinois Abolished the Death Penalty, 30 LAW & INEQ.
245, 246, 278–79 (2012) (referring to the cost issue as one of the “many serendipitous milestones on the
path to [death penalty] abolition in Illinois”).
IN AMERICA, 1972–1994, at
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Accordingly, the recent trend toward repealing death penalty laws
should be viewed through the lens of an “interest-convergence” narrative.
The concept of interest-convergence finds its roots in the late Derrick
Bell’s work on the civil rights movement.8 Bell argued that racial
desegregation in the United States occurred largely because African
Americans’ interest in achieving equality converged with white
policymakers’ interests in maintaining the country’s reputation during the
Cold War and promoting economic growth in the South.9 Applying Bell’s
interest-convergence theory to the death penalty context, this Note
demonstrates that the abolition of the death penalty in several states has
partly resulted from a convergence between anti-death penalty advocates’
interests in ending capital punishment and state lawmakers’ interests in
balancing the budget and appearing fiscally responsible in a time of
financial crisis. By focusing on the costs and inefficiencies of capital
punishment, the anti-death penalty movement has given state policymakers
a self-interested reason to abolish capital punishment: saving their
constituents millions of dollars (and increasing their chances at reelection).
Part I of this Note describes Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence
theory, as well as ways in which contemporary scholars have applied and
challenged the theory. Next, Part II discusses the history of the anti-death
penalty movement and its previous focus on moral arguments against
capital punishment. Part III then describes the movement’s recent shift
towards creating an interest-convergence story by attacking state death
penalty laws on fiscal grounds. This Part specifically focuses on the antideath penalty movement’s successful campaigns to repeal state death
penalty statutes in New Jersey, New Mexico, Illinois, Connecticut, and
Maryland. Finally, Part IV examines challenges to the cost argument and
suggests reasons why interest-convergence has helped end the death
penalty in some states but not in others.
This Note does not claim that interest-convergence is the only factor
behind the repeal of death penalty statutes in New Jersey, New Mexico,
Illinois, Connecticut, and Maryland. Scholars who have studied death
penalty abolition in these states correctly point to certain state-specific
conditions that made abolition possible. Rob Warden, for example, argues
that exoneration of twelve death row inmates between 1987 and 1999
played a central role in the abolition of the death penalty in Illinois.10
Writing about death penalty abolition in New Jersey, Robert Martin
maintains that the repeal would not have occurred without support from
8

See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524–26 (1980) (arguing that the interest-convergence between
African Americans and white policymakers was one of the reasons behind the success of the civil rights
movement).
9
See id. at 524–25.
10
Warden, supra note 7, at 245, 247–62.
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key Democrats in the state legislature.11 Although state-specific factors are
an important piece of the death penalty abolition puzzle, they do not
explain why states in general are breaking the three-decade-long death
penalty reform stalemate.12 By looking at the recent trend as an interestconvergence story, however, one can see the reason for the state
momentum—and why it is gaining speed.
I. DERRICK BELL’S INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THEORY
Derrick Bell, a law professor and pioneer of critical race theory, first
introduced the idea of “interest-convergence” in the context of the civil
rights movement.13 Bell argued that desegregation in the United States, and
specifically the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,14 was not solely based on the Court’s interest in remedying
injustice against blacks in America.15 Instead, the Court’s “sudden shift . . .
away from the separate but equal doctrine and towards a commitment to
desegregation” largely occurred because “it converge[d] with the interests
of whites.”16 According to Bell, white policymakers were interested in
ending racial segregation in the United States because of the “economic
and political advances at home and abroad that would follow [its]
abandonment.”17 They recognized that desegregation would not only
improve the country’s international reputation during the Cold War, but
also help further industrialization in the South.18 Ultimately, Bell believed
that “[blacks] could not obtain meaningful relief until policymakers
perceived that the relief blacks sought furthered [their own] interests.”19
Numerous scholars have since applied Bell’s interest-convergence
theory to modern racial justice issues, as well as other areas of law and
policy.20 For example, many scholars, including Bell, have used interest11

See Martin, supra note 2, at 524–30.
See Jeremy W. Peters, Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, Then Commutes Sentences of 8,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at B3 (stating that in December 2007, “New Jersey [became] the first state
to repeal the death penalty since the United States Supreme Court set the framework for the modern
capital punishment system in 1976”).
13
See generally Bell, supra note 8 (introducing “the interest-convergence dilemma” for civil rights
litigation—the idea that whites would only help African Americans achieve equality in the United
States if it was in their own interests); Fred A. Bernstein, Derrick Bell, Pioneering Law Professor and
Civil Rights Advocate, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, at A18.
14
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15
See Bell, supra note 8, at 524.
16
Id. at 523–24.
17
Id. at 524.
18
Id. at 524–25.
19
Derrick Bell, Jr., Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003).
20
See Stephen M. Feldman, Do the Right Thing: Understanding the Interest-Convergence Thesis,
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 248, 248 & n.2 (2012) (listing the various scholars who have “extended
[Bell’s theory] to other contexts”); see also, e.g., Justin Stec, The Deconcentration of Poverty as an
Example of Derrick Bell’s Interest-Convergence Dilemma: White Neutrality Interests, Prisons, and
12
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convergence to explain affirmative action policies.21 According to Bell,
affirmative action in higher education developed because of a convergence
between minority students’ interests in attending elite universities and
businesses’ interests in having their future employees exposed to a diverse
student body.22 In other words, universities enacted affirmative action
programs because they made their student bodies more appealing to
employers, thereby benefiting the universities. They did not enact
affirmative action programs—at least not solely—out of an equitable
interest in remedying social consequences of past discrimination.23
Similarly, other scholars argue that minorities can prevent racial
discrimination in employment by appealing to employers’ interest in a
diverse work environment.24
Fewer scholars have applied Bell’s interest-convergence theory
outside of racial contexts. Applying interest-convergence to animal rights,
Joseph Lubinski argues that humans usually only act to protect animal
rights when doing so serves a human interest.25 Accordingly, he suggests
that activists can achieve animal rights reform by, for example, pointing to
studies that link eating meat with an increased risk of cancer.26 Considering
interest-convergence in a religious context, Stephen Feldman argues that
religious minorities benefit from greater rights when their interests
converge with the interests of Christians because Christians make up the
majority of American society.27 Taking the interest-convergence concept
further, Cynthia Lee developed the concept of “cultural convergence,”
which posits that a criminal defendant’s use of cultural evidence to mitigate
a charge or sentence—the so-called “cultural defense”—is more likely to

Changing Inner Cities, 2 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 30, 30 (2007) (applying Bell’s theory to modern
poverty deconcentration programs).
21
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundelay: Hernandez v. Texas and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23, 54–55 (2006); Amy Christian McCormick &
Robert A. McCormick, Race and Interest Convergence in NCAA Sports, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y
17, 18–19 (2012).
22
Bell, supra note 19, at 1624–26.
23
See Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic
Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1767 (2004) (“[A]ffirmative action in
college admissions is a partial remedy for the social consequences of past and present discrimination in
public education.”).
24
See, e.g., Joseph C. Feldman, Standing and Delivering on Title VII’s Promises: White
Employees’ Ability to Sue Employers for Discrimination Against Nonwhites, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 569, 600–01 (1999); Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII After
Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOW. L.J. 937, 959 (2005).
25
See Joseph Lubinski, Note, Screw the Whales, Save Me! The Endangered Species Act, Animal
Protection, and Civil Rights, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 377, 407 (2003) (“[I]n the case of animals, society is likely to
only act to substantially protect animal life when a human interest is implicated.”).
26
Id. at 411.
27
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY
OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 273–75 (1997).
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succeed in a U.S. court when the cultural norms underlying the defense
converge with American cultural norms.28 Scholars have also used Bell’s
interest-convergence theory in the context of poverty deconcentration
policies,29 immigration reform,30 and same-sex marriage laws.31
Not all scholars, on the other hand, have embraced Bell’s interestconvergence theory. Namely, Justin Driver argues that by relying on
moments of “fortuity,” Bell’s theory affords a “near total absence of
agency to both black citizens and white citizens.”32 Driver’s critique is an
important one. As Driver concedes, Bell did recognize the important role
that civil rights activists played in achieving racial equality.33 Yet, Bell also
referred to blacks as “fortuitous beneficiaries” of the interest-convergence
phenomenon.34 Accordingly, Bell seemingly undermined the role of black
activists by treating their work as secondary to the fortuitous events—the
Cold War and economic growth in the South—that made policymakers
view desegregation as beneficial to their own interests.35 Stephen Feldman,
however, argues that Driver’s critique suffers from a “misunderstanding of
the interest-convergence thesis as future-oriented.”36 Instead of using
interest-convergence as “a strategy for the future,” Feldman argues that
scholars should use interest-convergence only as “a tool . . . to help explain
historical developments related to social justice.”37 Driver and Feldman are
equally right and wrong. Feldman correctly notes that Bell used interestconvergence to prove a historical pattern,38 with hindsight’s full benefit. At
the same time, reducing interest-convergence to a retrospective theory with
no value as an affirmative strategy for advocates would be ill-advised.

28

See Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural
Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 939 (2007).
29
See Stec, supra note 20.
30
See George A. Martínez, Arizona, Immigration, and Latinos: The Epistemology of Whiteness, the
Geography of Race, Interest Convergence, and the View from the Perspective of Critical Theory,
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175, 195–200 (2012).
31
See Keeva Terry, Same-Sex Relationships, DOMA, and the Tax Code: Rethinking the Relevance
of DOMA to Straight Couples, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 384, 384 (2011) (arguing that “the interests
of same–sex couples are only accommodated when they coincide with the interests of heterosexual
couples”).
32
Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 165 (2011).
33
Id. at 176 n.143 (noting that “Bell’s early formulation of the interest-convergence thesis
demonstrated considerably greater awareness of . . . black agency” (citing Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial
Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Conditions, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 28 (1976))).
34
DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED
HOPE FOR RACIAL REFORM 159 (2004).
35
See Driver, supra note 32, at 176 (arguing that Bell’s interest-convergence theory underestimates
the power of litigation strategies and mobilization).
36
Feldman, supra note 20, at 256.
37
Id. at 259.
38
Id.
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This Note supports Bell’s interest-convergence theory and refutes
Driver’s view that interest-convergence and agency are incompatible.39 It
also refutes Feldman’s argument that interest-convergence cannot be
forward-looking.40 After discovering the substantial cost implications of
state death penalty laws, anti-death penalty advocates started to emphasize
the economic benefits that would result from abolition of the death
penalty.41 They created an interest-convergence story that aligned the
interests of death penalty advocates with nonmoral interests of state
policymakers and succeeded in influencing policymakers’ decisions to end
capital punishment. This contradicts Feldman’s suggestion that advocates
cannot use interest-convergence as a strategy for achieving future social
change. And although certain coincidental events, such as the 2008
financial crisis, were likely necessary for the cost argument to succeed, the
interest-convergence was made possible by the anti-death penalty
movement’s cost-focused campaign. Thus, contrary to Driver’s argument,42
the anti-death penalty movement did not wait passively for interestconvergence to occur.
II. BACKGROUND: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT, 1790S–1990S
Although a powerful anti-death penalty movement itself cannot bring
an end to capital punishment in the United States, “it is a necessary
precondition.”43 Between the 1790s and 1990s, anti-death penalty
advocates led numerous campaigns to abolish capital punishment
throughout the country. Specifically, they argued for an end to the death
penalty on grounds that it was morally wrong, and even unconstitutional.
Yet, the movement’s moral arguments failed to convince state legislatures
or the U.S. Supreme Court to put an end to capital punishment. In fact, by
the end of the twentieth century, the death penalty in America was thriving.
A. The Early Years
Americans first started to voice their opposition to the death penalty
when the United States gained independence from England in the
eighteenth century.44 Although capital punishment was less prevalent in the
39

See Driver, supra note 32, at 175–76 (“[A]ccord[ing] [them] an almost complete absence of
agency[,] . . . interest-convergence . . . views black people as mere ‘fortuitous beneficiaries’ and
instructs them to expect . . . advances toward racial equality . . . .”).
40
Feldman, supra note 20, at 257 (arguing that “interest-convergence [is not] a forward-looking
thesis that . . . predict[s] future behavior”).
41
See infra Part III.
42
See generally Driver, supra note 32, at 190 (stating that “[a] leading consequence of subscribing
to the interest-convergence theory as the only (or even the predominant) method of achieving reform is
its inculcation of passivity in its adherents”).
43
HAINES, supra note 4.
44
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 336 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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American colonies, by the eighteenth century, each colony recognized an
average of twelve capital crimes.45 During the anti-death penalty
movement’s early years, advocates based their opposition to the death
penalty solely on moral arguments. They generally argued that it is morally
wrong to kill another human being, whether that killing is done by an
individual or the state.46
In contrast to later years, anti-death penalty advocates in the late 1700s
focused their efforts on narrowing death-eligible offenses to particularly
heinous crimes, rather than abolishing the death penalty altogether.47 For
example, Benjamin Rush, one of the signers of the Declaration of
Independence, worked with the then-Pennsylvania Attorney General to
repeal the death penalty in Pennsylvania for all offenses except for firstdegree murder.48 Thomas Jefferson, John Jay, and James Madison also all
supported limiting the use of the death penalty.49
The anti-death penalty movement shifted towards a fight for abolition
in the 1800s.50 Many Americans, who, like those who opposed slavery,
called themselves “abolitionists,” lobbied for death penalty abolition bills
in state legislatures throughout the mid-1800s.51 Anti-death penalty
lobbyists helped abolish capital punishment in Michigan in 1847,52 Rhode
Island in 1852, and Wisconsin in 1853,53 as well as several other states at
the turn of the century.54 Their success, however, was temporary: all but
three of the states reversed the legislation by the end of World War I.55
In the 1920s, the newly created American League to Abolish Capital
Punishment (ALACP) helped to reenergize the anti-death penalty
movement. The ALACP’s primary goals included coordinating campaigns
45

Id. at 335.
See LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776–1865, at 3–5 (1989); Furman, 408 U.S. at 296–97 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
47
See HAINES, supra note 4, at 8 (“[W]hereas relatively few [abolitionists] called for complete
abolition of the death penalty during the eighteenth century, many more did so by the early 1830s.”).
48
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement
in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 3, 6–7 (2002).
49
Id. at 6 n.26.
50
See id. at 7 (describing the anti-death penalty’s abolition efforts in the 1800s).
51
HAINES, supra note 4, at 5, 8.
52
Michigan only retained capital punishment for individuals who committed treason against the
state. Phillip English Mackey, Introduction to VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1787–1975, at xxvi (Phillip English Mackey ed., 1976).
53
Id. at xxvi–xxviii.
54
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 372 app. I (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (listing seven
other states that abolished capital punishment between 1872 and 1914).
55
Id. at 339–40 (stating that four states reinstituted capital punishment “under the nervous tension
of World War I”). Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin were the only states that did not restore capital
punishment at this time. Id. at 372 app. I (listing states that abolished and restored the death penalty
between 1846 and 1968).
46
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to introduce state abolition bills and educating the public about capital
punishment, including the moral and practical problems involved with the
practice.56 The ALACP also helped undermine the deterrence rationale for
the death penalty by conducting some of the first empirical investigations
on the deterrent effect of capital punishment.57 The ALACP argued that,
contrary to the arguments of death penalty supporters, the death penalty
does not deter dangerous criminals from committing crimes.58 The
organization’s founders, including Clarence Darrow and Lewis Lawes,59
were also some of the first activists to present information on racial
discrimination in capital sentencing.60 Despite the influential role that the
ALACP played in the anti-death penalty movement, the organization failed
to achieve any changes in state death penalty policies.61

56

HAINES, supra note 4, at 10–11.
Id.; see Jay Holmes, Retention of Death Penalty Favored by Judges, Lawyers, AMSTERDAM
RECORDER, Sept. 12, 1957, at 11 (stating that the ALACP and other organizations disagreed with claim
that capital punishment deterred crime). Supporters of the death penalty argue that the threat of capital
punishment deters people from committing capital offenses more than the threat of long-term
imprisonment because death is unarguably the most severe sanction. Michael L. Radelet & Marian J.
Borg, The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 44–45 (2000).
58
See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 218 (2002) (“The
American League to Abolish Capital Punishment collected homicide data from the Census Bureau to
demonstrate that the states with capital punishment had an average homicide rate more than twice as
high as those without.”). The problem with the deterrence argument, for both sides of the debate, is that
the deterrent effect of the death penalty is difficult to prove. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184–
85 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (plurality opinion) (stating that the results of
statistical attempts to evaluate the deterrent effect of the death penalty have been inconclusive); David
P. Phillips, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM.
J. SOC. 139, 146 (1980) (arguing that capital punishment has a short-term, but not long-term deterrent
effect). Compare Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and
Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741, 741 (1977) (arguing that “[f]indings indicate a substantial
deterrent effect of [capital] punishment on murder and related violent crimes”), with William J. Bowers
& Glenn L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich’s Research on Capital Punishment,
85 YALE L.J. 187, 187 (1975) (arguing that Ehrlich’s research on capital punishment “failed to provide
any reliable evidence that the death penalty deters murder”).
59
See MICHAEL KRONENWETTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 119, 170 (2d
ed. 2001) (listing Clarence Darrow and Lewis Lawes as two founders of the ALACP).
60
See, e.g., CLARENCE DARROW, FARMINGTON 212–13 (1904); KRONENWETTER, supra note 59, at
119; Lewis E. Lawes, The Death Penalty at Sing Sing, 59 SURV. MIDMONTHLY 69, 70 (1927).
61
In fact, during the 1930s, there were more executions than in any other decade. THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 10 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997). From 1930 to
1939, 1667 prisoners were executed in the United States. LARRY J. SIEGAL & CLEMENS BARTOLLAS,
CORRECTIONS TODAY 304 (2011). At the same time, Gallup conducted its first poll on the death penalty
in 1936 and found that 59% of Americans supported imposing capital punishment for murder
convictions. Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited
Mar. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Death Penalty, GALLUP].
57
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B. The Mid-Twentieth Century
The anti-death penalty movement became more powerful in the 1950s
and helped accomplish important legislative reforms, some of which were
permanent. Between 1957 and 1965, anti-death penalty advocates helped
pass abolition bills in Delaware, Oregon, West Virginia, Hawaii, and
Alaska.62 Meanwhile, Vermont, New York, and New Mexico passed
legislation that limited the death penalty to extraordinary offenses.63 At the
same time, the yearly rate of executions started to decline, especially in the
northern and western regions of the country.64 For example, while 199
executions took place in 1935, there were 117 executions in 1945 and only
76 executions by 1955.65
Along with the declining rate of executions, the establishment of
several anti-death penalty organizations in the 1950s and 1960s
strengthened the movement’s efforts. Some of these organizations,
including Citizens Against Legalized Murder (CALM), the New Jersey
Council to Abolish Capital Punishment, and the Ohio Committee to
Abolish Capital Punishment were affiliated with the ALACP.66 These
organizations inspired the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to
come out against the death penalty in 1965 and establish its “Capital
Punishment Project” in the 1970s to help coordinate the activities of antideath penalty organizations throughout the country.67
Despite growth in the anti-death penalty movement in the 1950s and
1960s, the movement faced a fairly major setback in 1962 when the
American Law Institute (ALI) decided not to recommend the abolition of
the death penalty when it created the Model Penal Code (MPC)—a largely
successful attempt to codify criminal law in the United States.68 Before
creating the MPC, the ALI commissioned Thorsten Sellin—a renowned
criminologist at the University of Pennsylvania,69 as well as a board
member of the ALACP70—to produce a major research report addressing
capital punishment.71 Sellin’s research focused on main issues within the
death penalty debate at the time, including deterrence, proportionality, and
62

See Kirchmeier, supra note 48, at 11–12.
WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864–1982, at 9
(1984).
64
HAINES, supra note 4, at 11–12.
65
Id. at 12.
66
Id.
67
See id. at 25, 49.
68
See Russell Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler’s Ghost: The Influence of the Model Penal Code
on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 190, 202–06 (2004).
69
Franklin E. Zimring, The Unexamined Death Penalty: Capital Punishment and Reform of the
Model Penal Code, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1396, 1400 (2005).
70
HAINES, supra note 4, at 11.
71
Id.; see THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959).
63
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racial discrimination.72 Despite Sellin’s findings that capital punishment
had no deterrent effect on homicide rates,73 however, the ALI decided not
to recommend abolition.74
C. The Civil Rights Era
While the anti-death penalty movement had previously focused on
abolishing capital punishment through state legislation, in the late 1960s,
the movement’s focus shifted to the courts. Several organizations, such as
the ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF),
focused on challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty by
appealing capital cases.75 For a short period in the 1960s, public support for
capital punishment reached its lowest levels in recorded history, with
almost half of Americans opposing the death penalty.76
The LDF developed a death penalty “moratorium strategy” in 1966.77
Under its strategy, the LDF aimed to block all executions in the United
States by representing every death row inmate who sought the
organization’s assistance.78 At the same time, the organization challenged
the constitutionality of the death penalty on grounds that complete jury
discretion in capital cases violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution.79 To carry out the moratorium strategy, LDF reached
out to a number of national and state anti-death penalty organizations and
intervened in hundreds of capital cases throughout the country.80 In 1968,
the LDF organized a National Conference on Capital Punishment in New
York for over one hundred lawyers and advocates with the goal of
developing a more cohesive litigation strategy for ending the death
penalty.81
72

Zimring, supra note 69, at 1407.
SELLIN, supra note 71, at 63 (“Any one who carefully examines the above data is bound to arrive
at the conclusion that the death penalty, as we use it, exercises no influence on the extent or fluctuating
rates of capital crimes. It has failed as a deterrent.”).
74
See Covey, supra note 68, at 200–06; Zimring, supra note 69, at 1400–01.
75
See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 49 (2011).
76
Andrew Kohut, The Declining Support for Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A33
(stating that “by the mid 1960’s . . . most people were opposed” to the death penalty, and “[p]ublic
support dropped to 42 percent, a 50-year low, in a 1966 Gallup poll”); Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman
Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 50 (2007) (“[1966] marked the lowest level of death penalty
support in recorded history . . . .”).
77
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
AGENDA 33 (1986); Michael Meltsner, Litigating Against the Death Penalty: The Strategy Behind
Furman, 82 YALE L.J. 1111, 1112 (1973).
78
See Meltsner, supra note 77.
79
Kirchmeier, supra note 48, at 13–14.
80
MELTSNER, supra note 75, at 80, 84.
81
Meltsner, supra note 77, at 1117 (“The purpose of the 1968 conference, however, was not
technical; its aim was to bring the participants together for a face-to-face encounter, and at this it
73
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In 1972, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v.
Georgia82 was a key victory for the LDF, as well as the anti-death penalty
movement in general.83 The decision struck down state death penalty
statutes across the United States. The Court held that by giving juries
unguided discretion to impose the death penalty, states were administering
capital punishment in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.84 Justice Marshall, in his
concurring opinion, emphasized the “partial successes” of anti-death
penalty activists in tempering capital punishment in the United States.85 In
December 1971, six months before the Supreme Court decided Furman,
Congress held its first hearing on the death penalty in twelve years.86 In
consideration of the Court’s upcoming decision, members of the House
Judiciary Committee proposed a bill to suspend the death penalty
throughout the United States in order to give state authorities and Congress
more time to reexamine the constitutional issues surrounding capital
punishment.87 However, Congress never passed a bill to suspend the death
penalty, and the effects of the Furman decision were short-lived.
D. The 1980s and 1990s
Many people thought that Furman signaled the end of the death
penalty in the United States.88 In reality, however, Furman had the opposite
effect and worked to reverse the previously increasing momentum in many
states towards death penalty abolition. In response to Furman, twenty-eight
states passed new death penalty statutes that complied with the Supreme
Court’s mandate by making the capital sentencing process less arbitrary.89
In a series of decisions in 1976, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a majority of these state death penalty statutes.90 At the
succeeded handsomely. This first confrontation of numerous professionals who had previously worked
alone gave the movement a cohesion that it had lacked.”).
82
408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam).
83
See HAINES, supra note 4, at 14; Meltsner, supra note 77, at 1111.
84
See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40; see also id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
85
Id. at 341–42 (Marshall, J., concurring).
86
See Capital Punishment: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. No. 3 on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 18
(1972) (statement of Senator Kastenmeier) [hereinafter 1972 Hearings].
87
Id.
88
See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Cruel and Unusual Punishments, 86 HARV. L. REV. 76, 85
(1972) (“Whatever the possibilities for narrower death penalty statutes after Furman, the Court has
prohibited capital punishment in the overwhelming majority of cases . . . [and] Furman may contain the
seeds . . . of a complete proscription of the death penalty in the future.”); Furman, 408 U.S. at 239 (per
curiam).
89
HAINES, supra note 4, at 14.
90
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(plurality opinion); see also Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the
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same time, public support for capital punishment increased from a low of
42% in 1966 to 66% by 1976.91
In 1987, the anti-death penalty movement suffered another significant
blow when the Supreme Court held in McCleskey v. Kemp that evidence of
racial discrimination in capital sentencing did not violate the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment.92 As a result of the judicial disappointments they
suffered post-Furman, anti-death penalty advocates realized that they must
try—once again—to turn state legislatures and the public against capital
punishment. Their public education campaigns throughout the 1980s and
1990s, however, did little to turn public opinion against the death penalty.
By the 1990s, capital punishment was “flourishing” in the United States.93
In 1993, thirty-eight people were executed throughout the country, which
was more than any other year since the 1960s.94 Also, more than 70% of
Americans supported capital punishment during the 1980s and 1990s.95
Similarly, the anti-death penalty’s lobbying efforts were fruitless in
light of the robust public support for capital punishment in the country. At
the time, any elected officials who publicly opposed the death penalty
essentially risked sacrificing their political careers.96 For instance, in the
1988 presidential race between Michael Dukakis and George H.W. Bush,
Dukakis lost significant support from voters because he said that he
opposed the death penalty in a televised debate.97 By the 1990s, it was clear
that the anti-death penalty movement needed a new strategy.
III. THE MODERN ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT’S FOCUS ON COST
As early as the 1980s, people on both sides of the death penalty debate
started to become aware of the costs involved in capital punishment
compared to life imprisonment.98 In fact, in Furman, Justice Marshall
recognized that “[w]hen all is said and done, there can be no doubt that it
Capital-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 800–01 (1998) (“In the 1976 cases, the Supreme
Court upheld statutes from Florida, Georgia, and Texas . . . [and] struck down statutes from Louisiana
and North Carolina . . . .”).
91
Death Penalty, GALLUP, supra note 61.
92
481 U.S. 279, 298–99, 308 (1987).
93
HAINES, supra note 4, at 3.
94
Id.
95
Support for capital punishment was above 70% in every Gallup poll conducted between 1985
and 1999. One poll from 1981 showed that 66% of respondents supported the death penalty, while data
from 1982–1984 is not available. Death Penalty, GALLUP, supra note 61.
96
Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty’s Strange Career, 26 WILSON Q., Spring 2002, at 70, 74.
97
See id.
98
See, e.g., Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life
Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 45, 47 (1989) (concluding that the
death penalty costs more than life in prison); Margot Garey, Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life:
Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1270 (1985) (arguing that the
“death penalty process results in astronomical costs—both morally and financially”).
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costs more to execute a man than to keep him in prison for life.”99
Nevertheless, largely because of the scant data available on the costs of
state death penalty systems, anti-death penalty advocates did not begin to
use cost as an argument against capital punishment until the end of the
1990s.100 Before then, cost, if mentioned at all, was generally used as an
argument in support of the death penalty. For instance, in 1983, Ernest van
den Haag, a prominent death penalty supporter, asserted that it was cheaper
to execute a criminal than keep him in prison for most of his life.101
Around the turn of the twenty-first century, research conducted by
newspaper reporters and academics in various states began to reveal the
high costs of the modern death penalty system.102 For example, in 1988,
The Miami Herald reported that the cost of the death penalty in Florida was
$3.2 million per execution compared to $600,000 for life imprisonment.103
Similarly, The Dallas Morning News reported in 1992 that the trials and
appeals of a capital case alone cost Texas $2.3 million per case on average,
which was approximately three times the cost of imprisoning someone for
forty years.104 In 1993, a report by professors at Duke University found that
the death penalty cost North Carolina $2.16 million more per execution
than murder cases with the sentence of life imprisonment.105 Columbia
University published a report on capital punishment in 2000, which found
99

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Although scholars started to argue that the death penalty was costly as early as the 1990s, see,
e.g., Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty in
American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 711, 719 (1990–1991), anti-death penalty
advocates did not make this argument in their campaigns at the time. Ben Johnson from the Connecticut
Network to Abolish the Death Penalty (CNADP) stated that the Connecticut anti-death penalty
movement, for instance, did not start using the cost argument until it had figures on the costs of capital
punishment in the state. Telephone Interview with Ben Johnson, former Exec. Dir., CNADP (Jan. 29,
2013).
101
Michael L. Radelet & Marian J. Borg, The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates,
26 ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 50 (2000). According to Jeremy Schroeder, the former Executive Director of the
Illinois Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (ICADP), before the anti-death penalty movement
focused on the cost argument, people assumed that the death penalty was more expensive than life in
prison because it is counterintuitive that the death penalty would cost more. Telephone Interview with
Jeremy Schroeder, former Exec. Dir., ICADP (Jan. 30, 2013). As a result, many Americans who
supported the death penalty in the 1980s and 1990s cited the high costs of imprisonment as a reason for
their position. Mark Costanzo & Lawrence T. White, An Overview of the Death Penalty and Capital
Trials: History, Current Status, Legal Procedures, and Cost, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 1, 1, 9 (1994); see
Radelet & Borg, supra note 101 (citing a 1985 Gallup poll finding that one reason provided by 11% of
Americans who supported the death penalty was that it would save costs).
102
See Radelet & Borg, supra note 101.
103
D. Von Drehle, Bottom Line: Life in Prison One-Sixth as Expensive, MIAMI HERALD, July 10,
1988, at 12A; Editorial, Judicial Wisdom, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 3, 1998, at 12A (referring to
1988 Miami Herald study finding that Florida spent approximately $3.2 million per execution compared
to $600,000 to imprison someone for life).
104
Christy Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1992, at 1A.
105
PHILIP J. COOK & DONNA B. SLAWSON, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF LORI A. GRIES, THE COSTS
OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA 98 (1993).
100

689

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

that 68% of capital judgments were “seriously flawed” and that capital
cases cost significantly more than noncapital ones.106 Consequently, the
report concluded that “large amounts of resources are being wasted on
cases that should never have been capital in the first place.”107
These early reports on the fiscal realities of the death penalty came
from different states and therefore varied in their estimates on the costs of
capital punishment.108 Nonetheless, they all confirmed one thing: states
would save millions of dollars if they replaced the death penalty with
sentences of life imprisonment without parole. The high cost of the death
penalty does not mean that the executions themselves are more expensive
than keeping a criminal in prison for life. Rather, the high costs of the death
penalty reflect the fact that capital prosecutions often involve lengthy trials
and multiple appeals.109 Complex pretrial motions, jury selections,
investigations, and expensive expert witnesses all add to the costs of death
penalty cases.110 Meanwhile, the post-conviction phase of capital cases
involves a technical appeals process that creates additional costs for both
the prosecution and defense, with taxpayers typically footing the bill.111
Taxpayers pay not only for the costs of the trials and appeals, but also for
the extra costs of incarcerating capital prisoners in facilities separate from
general prison populations.112
In addition to research on the high costs of capital punishment, the
anti-death penalty movement’s focus on the problem of wrongful
convictions was a necessary predicate for the cost argument to succeed in
106

James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital
Cases, 1973–1995, at 15–16 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp.,
Paper No. 15, 2000).
107
Id. at 16.
108
Part of the reason for the difference in death penalty costs among states results from different
capital sentencing procedures, as well as the frequency of capital prosecution, which is largely
determined by the district attorneys in a particular area. Telephone Interview with Robert Owen,
Clinical Professor, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law (Jan. 25, 2013).
109
See Leigh B. Bienen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the Aftermath of the Ryan
Commutations: Reforms, Economic Realities, and a New Saliency for Issues of Cost, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1301, 1363 (2010) (“Along the way, the [capital] appeals become more technical, more
controversial, and more costly[,] . . . and the taxpayers pay for the costs . . . .”).
110
Telephone Interview with Robert Owen, supra note 108 (capital defense attorneys must find
detailed information about defendants’ lives for capital cases, which requires substantial time and
work).
111
See Costanzo & White, supra note 101, at 10–12 (explaining the costs of the capital punishment
process); see also Frederic Block, Op-Ed., A Slow Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at A27 (stating
that taxpayers typically pay for both the prosecution and defense of capital cases). Although some
states, such as Florida, have attempted to reduce costs by placing time restrictions on post-conviction
appeals, these laws may violate the due process rights of death row inmates. See Jonathan Mattise,
Negron Death Penalty Law Challenged, STUART NEWS, June 28, 2013, at 1A. Moreover, the majority
of costs stem from the pretrial and trial phases. Editorial, High Cost of Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2009, at A22. Thus, laws limiting the appeals process are unlikely to result in much cost savings.
112
See Bienen, supra note 109, at 1363, 1386.
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convincing state legislatures to abolish the death penalty. Beginning in the
1990s, the availability of DNA testing helped exonerate many death row
inmates.113 In 1998, hundreds of anti-death penalty advocates, scholars, and
journalists came to Chicago for the National Conference on Wrongful
Convictions and the Death Penalty.114 Prior to the conference, advocates
had not focused on wrongful convictions in capital cases as an area of
serious concern.115 After the conference, however, the frequency of
wrongful convictions became one of the main talking points for the antideath penalty movement.116 Evidence that people were being executed for
crimes they did not commit undermined a main justification for the death
penalty: retribution.117 When more than 100 people sentenced to death were
innocent and thus did not “deserve” to die, it became much more difficult
for death penalty supporters to rely on retribution as a justification for
capital punishment.118
The problem of wrongful convictions “trigger[ed a] reexamination of
the costs and benefits of capital punishment” in a way that other challenges
to the death penalty had failed to do.119 It encouraged several states to
examine their death penalty policies in order to fix the errors in their capital
sentencing process. In 2000, an extensive wrongful convictions campaign
in Illinois helped lead to a temporary moratorium on capital punishment in
the state until the government could review the system.120 Governor George
Ryan stated that he “favor[ed] a moratorium, because [he had] grave
concerns about [Illinois’s] shameful record of convicting innocent people
and putting them on death row.”121 Around the same time, a coalition of
113

The very first DNA exoneration occurred in 1989. Jay D. Aronson & Simon A. Cole, Science
and the Death Penalty: DNA, Innocence, and the Debate over Capital Punishment in the United States,
34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 603, 610–11 (2009) (“By 1996, sixty-five people had been exonerated on the
basis of DNA evidence.”).
114
Warden, supra note 7, at 252–53.
115
Id.
116
Telephone Interview with Lawrence Marshall, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch. (Feb. 4,
2013). Professor Marshall used to be a professor at Northwestern University School of Law and
organized the National Conference.
117
Although retribution has not been considered a primary objective of criminal law in the United
States for over half a century, it remains one of the primary reasons that the American public supports
the death penalty. Banner, supra note 96, at 77. In the 1980s and 1990s, polls showed that the majority
of Americans who were pro-capital punishment would still support the death penalty even if it did not
result in fewer murders. Id.
118
See Editorial, 110 Wrongful Convictions, and Counting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at A16.
119
Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
573, 579 (2004).
120
See generally id. at 578 (arguing that “[t]he engine driving [the 2000 moratorium] was a series
of thirteen death row exonerations”).
121
Press Release, Ill. Governor’s Office, Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will
Appoint Commission to Review Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31, 2000), available at
http://www3.illinois.gov/PressReleases/showpressrelease.cfm?subjectid=3&recnum=359.

691

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Republicans and Democrats in Congress proposed a bill to combat
wrongful convictions in death penalty cases.122 And in Kansas v. Marsh,
four dissenting Supreme Court justices went so far as to state that the
“repeated exonerations of convicts under death sentences” made the death
penalty system unconstitutional.123
Once the anti-death penalty movement exposed the serious flaws in
the death penalty system, it became more difficult for state legislators to
claim that capital punishment was worth the millions of dollars in extra
costs. Consequently, activists started to focus on the cost arguments against
capital punishment by underscoring how states waste millions of dollars
each year on inefficient death penalty systems. Some organizations, such as
the ACLU, have produced their own studies on the high costs of capital
punishment.124 Other organizations have tried to raise public awareness
about the costs of capital punishment through online action reports,
newspaper editorials, and lobbying efforts.125 In particular, organizations
have emphasized the effect of capital punishment costs on already troubled
state budgets.126 For example, in a 2009 report, the Death Penalty
Information Center argued that there is “little support for continuing to
spend enormous sums on an ineffective program when so many other areas
of need are being short changed.”127
Anti-death penalty advocates contend that the cost argument focuses
not only on reducing state budget deficits, but also on opportunity costs.128
Anti-death penalty campaigns in various states have argued that instead of
spending millions of dollars on the death penalty, states would be better off
using the money for other important state and local uses. For example, in
New Jersey, Connecticut, and New Mexico, anti-death penalty advocates
proposed that the money saved as a result of abolishing the death penalty
should be used to provide additional law enforcement officers or victim
assistance.129 In California, Proposition 34—a recently defeated ballot
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H.R. 3214, 108th Cong. (2003); Editorial, Toward Death Penalty Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2003, at A16.
123
548 U.S. 163, 208, 211 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding that because of the prevalence of
wrongful convictions, the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment).
124
See, e.g., NATASHA MINSKER, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL., THE HIDDEN DEATH
TAX: THE SECRET COSTS OF SEEKING EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA (2008).
125
See supra Part IV.A–F, which discusses the various strategies carried out by anti-death penalty
organizations throughout the country.
126
See MINSKER, supra note 124, at 3–4.
127
RICHARD C. DIETER, DPIC, SMART ON CRIME: RECONSIDERING THE DEATH PENALTY IN A
TIME OF ECONOMIC CRISIS 6 (2009).
128
See New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Hearing 72–73 (Sept. 13, 2006) (statement of
Patrick Murray, Director, Monmouth University Polling Institute) [hereinafter Murray Testimony].
129
See New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission 87–88 (Oct. 25, 2006) (statement of Celeste
Fitzgerald, Director, New Jerseyans for Alternatives to the Death Penalty) [hereinafter Fitzgerald
Testimony]; Cost, N.M. REPEAL, http://www.nmrepeal.org/issues/cost (last visited Mar. 26, 2014);
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initiative to abolish capital punishment130—included a proposal to direct the
over $100 million annual savings to law enforcement agencies for
investigations of homicide and rape cases.131 When budget shortfalls force
state governments to make cuts, anti-death penalty advocates argue that
lawmakers should choose to get rid of the death penalty over other
necessary programs.
A. Cost and Abolition in New Jersey
The New Jersey legislature’s decision to abolish the death penalty in
2007132 illustrates the effectiveness of the cost argument for the anti-death
penalty movement. In 1999, anti-death penalty activists Lorry Post and
Celeste Fitzgerald established New Jerseyans for Alternatives to the Death
Penalty (NJADP).133 Rather than focusing their lobbying efforts on moral
and religious arguments, Fitzgerald and NJADP emphasized the costs of
the death penalty, wrongful executions, and the fact that New Jersey had
not executed anyone in forty years.134 Specifically, NJADP commissioned a
fiscal study of the state’s death penalty system, which found that abolishing
the death penalty would save New Jersey more than $11 million each
year.135 According to Fitzgerald, by focusing on the costs of capital cases,
NJADP was able to “attract [support from] people who thought the death
penalty was simply another waste of time and money.”136
Partly as a result of the lobbying efforts of the NJADP, in 2006 the
New Jersey legislature selected a state-sponsored Death Penalty Study
Commission to examine the effectiveness of the state’s death penalty

Victims’ Families, CNADP, http://www.cnadp.org/resources/issues/victims-families/ (last visited Apr.
5, 2014).
130
California voters defeated Proposition 34 on November 6, 2012. State Voters Back Death
Penalty, DAILY POST (PALO ALTO), Nov. 8, 2012, at 10.
131
TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE 95, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/
2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf#nameddest=prop34.
132
Peters, supra note 12.
133
R. Erik Lillquist et al., Panel III—Legislative Moratorium and the New Jersey Death Penalty
Study Commission, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 137 (2008) [hereinafter Panel III—Legislative
Moratorium].
134
Making History: The Repeal of the Death Penalty in New Jersey, METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNS., Mar. 2008, at 50. Although more than sixty people were sentenced to death between 1963 and
2007, the majority of sentences were overturned on appeal. Panel III—Legislative Moratorium, supra
note 133, at 139 n.7. At the time New Jersey repealed its death penalty statute, the state had eight men
on death row. Editorial, A Long Time Coming, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, at A22.
135
Robert Schwaneberg, N.J. Panel Counts Cost of Death Penalty, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 13, 2006,
at 29; Press Release, NJADP, New Report Finds Death Penalty Cost New Jersey Tax Payers $250
Million Since 1982 (Nov. 21, 2005), available at http://www.njadp.org/forms/cost/cost%20study%20
release.html (stating that NJADP commissioned the New Jersey Policy Perspective report).
136
Bob Braun, Chief Repeal Advocate Says It’s Time to ‘Close Up Shop,’ STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 13,
2007, at 17 (statement of Celeste Fitzgerald).
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policy.137 The Commission held hearings and heard from New Jersey
residents on both sides of the debate. Testimonies provided evidence about
the significant costs of the death penalty, as well as polls showing that only
36% of New Jersey residents preferred the death penalty to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.138 In addition to relying on
savings estimates from various New Jersey state agencies, the Commission
considered cost studies conducted by other states.139 In its 2007 report, the
Commission recommended that the New Jersey legislature abolish the
death penalty in the state.140 It found that capital punishment in New Jersey
did not “rationally serve[] a legitimate penological intent,” and that “[t]he
costs of the death penalty are greater than the costs of life in prison without
parole.”141
Around the same time of the Death Penalty Study Commission’s
report, New Jersey’s financial landscape had taken a turn for the worse. In
1999, when the NJADP started making its cost arguments, the state had
few fiscal problems. The Newark-based Star-Ledger, for instance, reported
that the 1999–2000 budget was “heavy on generosity and short on pain.”142
By 2007, however, it was widely recognized that “New Jersey ha[d] been
living beyond its means for more than a decade.”143 Although the national
financial crisis had not yet hit, in 2007 New Jersey was one of only a
handful of states facing a structural deficit.144 Indeed, New Jersey’s per
capita debt burden at the time was the third highest in the nation.145
Accordingly, in February 2007 Governor Corzine warned that the state
legislature would have to make some “tough choices” in order to mitigate
“the avalanche of growing fixed costs that hang over the state.”146
When Fitzgerald testified before the New Jersey Senate, she
encouraged lawmakers “to seriously consider the money-saving suggestion
of replacing the death penalty with life without parole . . . and the many
other ways that money could be spent.”147 And in December 2007, New
137

See Panel III—Legislative Moratorium, supra note 133, at 141.
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Jersey became the first state to abolish the death penalty legislatively since
1976.148 Achieving the twenty-one to sixteen vote in the New Jersey
legislature was not easy.149 However, NJADP brought cost to the forefront
of the debate at the exact time legislators were particularly interested in
finding ways to save money for the state.
B. Cost and Abolition in New Mexico
Cost also played a significant role in New Mexico’s decision to
abolish the death penalty in 2009. In New Mexico, the anti-death penalty
movement argued that money spent on capital punishment should be used
to help victims’ families.150 This was particularly successful because it
undermined one of the main arguments in support of the death penalty:
restitution for victims’ families.151 In February 2009, the New Mexico
House voted forty to twenty-eight to repeal the state’s death penalty statute,
and on March 13, 2009, the Senate voted twenty-four to eighteen in favor
of repeal.152 Before signing the bill to abolish the death penalty, Governor
Bill Richardson, a longstanding death penalty supporter, cited his concerns
about wrongful convictions. He also added that cost was “a valid reason [to
support the abolition of the death penalty] in this era of austerity and tight
budgets.”153 Indeed, in the months leading up to the repeal, New Mexico’s
government was facing a $454 million budget shortfall.154 Although New
Mexico’s economy grew rapidly in the early 2000s,155 the 2008 financial
crisis forced the state government to make drastic cuts for the first time in a
decade.156
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When the effort to abolish New Mexico’s death penalty began in 1997,
advocates attempted to introduce the cost argument into the death penalty
debate.157 At the time, however, there was very little information available
about the costs of New Mexico’s death penalty system.158 Thus, anti-death
penalty advocates did not focus on costs as a central part of their campaign
until several years later.159
Between 2004 and 2008, as more information on costs of the death
penalty system emerged—and the state’s budget deficit grew—New
Mexico’s anti-death penalty campaign shifted towards a greater emphasis
on cost. Although the New Mexico government never commissioned a
statewide study on the costs of capital punishment,160 the State Bar’s Task
Force on the Administration of the Death Penalty in New Mexico published
a report in 2004 outlining the reasons for the high costs of capital cases.161
Around the same time, then New Mexico Supreme Court Justice Bosson
estimated that the cost of a capital case in New Mexico was six times
higher than noncapital murder cases.162 The cost argument in New Mexico
was also strengthened by cost studies from other states, such as North
Carolina, which found that capital punishment cost more than life
imprisonment.163
157
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times”).
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The growing strength of the cost argument in New Mexico’s death
penalty debate is illustrated by a comparison of Fiscal Impact Reports for
Representative Gail Chasey’s abolition bills in 2001 (HB 239) and 2005
(HB 576) with the Fiscal Report for the abolition bill in 2009 (HB 285).
The Fiscal Impact Report for the 2001 bill suggested that costs “may
ultimately decrease with the repeal of the death penalty,” though it also
recognized the possibility that costs could be higher.164 While not explicitly
stating that repealing the death penalty would save money, the 2005 Fiscal
Impact Report indicated that jury and witness costs for a death penalty case
amounted to $20,000–$25,000 compared to $7000–$8000 for a non-death
penalty case.165 In contrast, the 2009 Fiscal Report stated that abolition of
the death penalty would save New Mexico several million dollars each
year.166
By 2008, NM Repeal (New Mexico’s largest anti-death penalty
advocacy group) and others used cost as one of their main “talking points”
when lobbying state legislators to support abolition.167 Although few
legislators mentioned cost when they publicly spoke in support of repeal,
state legislators were well aware of the cost implications of the bill by the
time they cast their votes in 2009.168 For instance, David Keys, a professor
of criminology at New Mexico State University, testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee and told the panel that a single execution in New
Mexico cost the state between $2.75 and $5 million.169 Viki Harrison, the
former Executive Director of NM Repeal, believes that state policymakers
considered cost as a factor in casting their votes, even if they did not say so
explicitly.170
According to Harrison, the cost-effectiveness argument was
particularly successful in New Mexico because the state had only executed
one person since 1960.171 As a result, in light of the high costs of the death
penalty, state lawmakers were more inclined to vote for abolition because
164
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171
Telephone Interview with Viki Harrison, supra note 167. At the time New Mexico repealed its
death penalty, two men were on death row. Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2009, at A16.

697

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

most defendants in capital cases ended up with life sentences anyway.172
During the House debate on the bill in 2009, Representative Gail Chasey
argued, “[I]n 48 years we’ve spent several million dollars a year for this
one execution. That’s not much of a return.”173
In addition to arguing that the death penalty was expensive and rarely
used, anti-death penalty advocates pointed out that the money used for New
Mexico’s death penalty system diverted resources from other state needs,
such as services for victims’ families.174 Murder Victims’ Families for
Reconciliation (MVFR), which played a large role in the effort to defeat the
death penalty in New Mexico, maintained that the death penalty did not
redress problems faced by victims’ families.175 MVFR worked with Chasey
and NM Repeal to create a list of victims’ services that could be established
as a result of the repeal’s cost savings.176 A 2008 statewide poll confirmed
that the majority of New Mexico residents—64%—supported replacing the
death penalty with life in prison without parole and allocating the saved
resources to services for victims’ families.177 The poll persuaded state
legislators to support the repeal by reassuring them that they would not face
public opposition if they voted for the bill.178
C. Cost and Abolition in Illinois
Anti-death penalty advocates in Illinois considered cost a crucial part
of their strategy to convince legislators to repeal the state’s death penalty
law in 2011. The ACLU, an organization with one of the most active antideath penalty campaigns in the state, argued that Illinois’s death penalty
was “expensive and [an] ineffective use of scarce resources.”179 Between
2002 and 2010, Illinois’s budget deficit climbed from $1.4 billion to $13
billion.180 Like activists in New Jersey and New Mexico, Illinois advocacy
172
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organizations also claimed that the state’s capital punishment system
ultimately harmed victims’ families by depriving them of resources that
could otherwise be used for therapy and law enforcement programs.181
The Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA), which voted to support
abolition of Illinois’s death penalty in 2008, also emphasized the cost and
inefficiencies of capital punishment in its efforts to push for death penalty
repeal. In a letter to Governor Pat Quinn, the ISBA stressed that $100
million had been spent on Illinois’s death penalty between 2003 and 2010,
and “it continues to be a legal crapshoot on who gets executed and who
doesn’t.”182 The ISBA also argued that the three main justifications for the
death penalty—incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution—were no longer
valid.183 Finally, the ISBA noted that Illinois residents supported life
without parole over the death penalty by a 2-to-1 margin (64% to 30%)
when they considered the millions of dollars spent on death penalty cases
every year.184 In other words, the IBSA showed that Illinois’s death penalty
involved substantial costs with next to no benefit.
Jeremy Schroeder, the former Executive Director of the Illinois
Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (ICADP), affirms that the costsaving aspect of repealing the death penalty helped the organization’s antideath penalty campaign.185 Namely, he says that the cost argument helped
ICADP get its “foot in the door” with legislators who had previously
supported capital punishment.186 ICADP used polling data, moreover, to
show legislators that the death penalty was no longer “the third rail”;
politicians could speak out against the death penalty without hurting their
chances of reelection.187 Ultimately, Schroeder believes “[i]t was the cost
savings plus having such a broken system that [the state hadn’t] used for 11
years” that persuaded Illinois lawmakers to vote for repeal.188
The impact of the cost argument is illustrated in statements by Illinois
legislators leading up to repeal. In 2011, during the Illinois Senate floor
debate on the bill (S.B. 3539) to abolish the death penalty, senators cited
181
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the costs of the death penalty as one of their reasons for supporting the
repeal bill. State Senator Jeffrey Schoenberg, who had previously
supported the death penalty, mentioned the costs of the state’s death
penalty system and argued that “whether you actually believe that the death
penalty is a deterrent or not, it’s an indisputable fact on the basis of
economics alone . . . [that] our system of capital punishment clearly does
not work in Illinois.”189 State Representative Karen Yarbrough, who
sponsored the House bill to abolish the death penalty, also based her
support for abolition on evidence that the state’s capital punishment system
is unfair, highly expensive to taxpayers, and does not serve as a deterrent to
crime.190 Specifically, Yarbrough pointed out that despite the state’s $13
billion budget shortfall, in ten years Illinois had spent more than $100
million on the death penalty without executing anyone.191 Under
Yarbrough’s bill, which was signed into law by Governor Pat Quinn on
March 9, 2011, the money saved from the death penalty would go towards
investigating unsolved cases and training law enforcement officials.192
D. Cost and Abolition in Connecticut
The cost of capital punishment was also a major part of the anti-death
penalty movement in Connecticut,193 as well as an important factor in the
state legislature’s decision to repeal its death penalty law in April 2012.
Like New Mexico, Connecticut did not carry out an official cost study on
the state’s death penalty system.194 When a bill to abolish the death penalty
was introduced in the state legislature in 2009, however, the Connecticut
General Assembly’s Office of Fiscal Analysis (OFA) estimated that the
death penalty cost the state approximately $4 million each year.195 In 2012,
the OFA estimated that the state would save $5 million each year by
abolishing the death penalty.196 In the months leading up to the repeal,
189
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several local newspapers reported on the high costs of the state’s death
penalty system.197 One newspaper estimated that Connecticut spent between
$100 million and $200 million on 240 capital cases since it reimplemented
capital punishment in the wake of Furman.198 At the same time, the state
only carried out one execution over three decades.199
The Connecticut Network to Abolish the Death Penalty (CNADP), the
ACLU, and the NAACP worked together to pressure legislators to vote for
repeal. They argued that “[t]he death penalty does not work” and costs
taxpayers far more than life in prison.200 The ACLU and others told state
legislators that Connecticut’s death penalty took money from the state that
could be used for other important state programs, such as education.201
Support from prominent law enforcement officers bolstered the cost
argument and convinced lawmakers that the death penalty was not an
effective use of law enforcement resources.202 Moreover, the campaign had
support from a large number of murder victims’ families who wrote letters
and conducted interviews arguing that capital punishment was not only
costly and inefficient, but also harmful to victims’ family members.203
Many state legislators who ultimately voted for repeal were persuaded
by the high costs of the death penalty, as well as evidence that there was
little support for capital punishment among murder victims’ families.204
Connecticut’s budget deficit grew from $500 million to $3.5 billion
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between 2009 and 2012.205 Accordingly, state legislators knew that a “no”
vote on the death penalty repeal bill would result in cuts to other state
programs. When signing the state’s death penalty repeal bill, Governor
Dannel P. Malloy cited the costly appeals process in capital cases as one of
the reasons for his decision to support the legislation.206
E. Cost and Abolition in Maryland
In 2013, Maryland became the most recent state to abolish capital
punishment. On March 15, 2013, the Maryland House of Delegates voted
eighty-two to fifty-six to repeal the state’s death penalty law.207 Cost played
a major role in Governor Martin O’Malley’s decision to file legislation to
repeal Maryland’s death penalty statute in January 2013.208 Over the past
four years, Governor O’Malley spoke out in favor of abolition on grounds
that “there are better and cheaper ways to reduce crime.”209 A 2008 study
found that Maryland spent $186 million more on capital cases over two
decades than it would have spent if the state did not have the death
penalty.210 At the same time, the state’s budget deficit grew from $432
million to $1.6 billion between 2008 and 2011.211
Similarly to other states, anti-death penalty advocates in Maryland
focused on the high costs of the state’s death penalty system in a time of
economic crisis. In addition, they argued that capital sentencing in
Maryland is prone to racial bias and fails to deter crime.212 With support
from anti-death penalty groups, Governor O’Malley called attention to the
fact that despite the state’s death penalty system, Baltimore has become
one of the most violent cities in the United States.213 The Governor
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explained, “The death penalty is expensive and it does not work. And for
that reason alone, I believe we should stop doing it.”214
F. Cost in Other States
Although most states still practice capital punishment, evidence shows
that lawmakers in death penalty states are becoming more concerned about
its costs. The cost and inefficiency argument has persuaded several state
governments to conduct detailed examinations into the fiscal impact of
their death penalty systems—an important first step towards perhaps
inevitable repeal. For example, in Indiana, the Legislative Services Agency
recently conducted a study on the costs of capital punishment in the state
and found that the average capital case cost more than twice the amount of
the average life-without-parole case.215 In July 2013, the Nevada legislature
passed a bill authorizing an audit of the state’s death penalty, to be
completed by January 2015.216 The Legislative Fiscal Analyst’s Office in
Utah recently conducted a study on the costs of the state’s death penalty
system, finding that the death penalty costs the state an additional $1.6
million per inmate compared to life without parole.217
In other states, lawmakers have specifically pointed to financial costs
as a basis for their decisions to cosponsor death penalty repeal bills. In
Kansas, for example, Senator Carolyn McGinn introduced a bill to abolish
the death penalty in 2009, citing the state’s “dire deficit situation” and the
need to look “outside the box to solve . . . budget problems.”218 In addition
to pointing out that Kansas had not executed anyone since 1965, she argued
that abolition of the death penalty could save Kansas over $500,000 per
capital case.219 Former Colorado lawmaker Paul Weissman also introduced
a bill to repeal the death penalty in 2009 to save money.220 The cost
argument has also helped change the minds of conservatives221 and
214
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lawmakers who had previously supported capital punishment. For instance,
Montana Conservatives Concerned About the Death Penalty joined the
anti-death penalty movement in Montana because of their belief that “[t]he
death penalty is another institution of government that is wasteful and
ineffective.”222 Representative Steve Handy, a Republican lawmaker from
Utah, recently called for a fiscal review of state and local government costs
of Utah’s death penalty system.223 Colorado’s President of the Senate, John
Morse, stated in 2012 that he would likely support a bill to repeal the
state’s death penalty statute, even though he had previously opposed efforts
to repeal the state’s death penalty law.224 Considering Colorado has only
executed one person since 1976, Morse recognizes that “[i]t costs a lot of
money to keep the death penalty on the books.”225
IV. COST, INTEREST-CONVERGENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
ANTI-DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT
By focusing on the costs of capital punishment, the anti-death penalty
movement has created an “interest-convergence” story. Advocacy
organizations now spend fewer resources on convincing state lawmakers
that abolishing the death penalty is morally right. Instead, anti-death
penalty advocates ask state lawmakers to consider the opportunity costs of
the death penalty.226
The cost argument has created an interest-convergence story because
anti-death penalty advocates are simply asking lawmakers to act in their
own best interests, as well as the interests of their constituents. As states
face substantial budget deficits, keeping the death penalty takes scarce
resources away from other areas of law enforcement and other programs.
The state legislatures mentioned in Part III, for example, all knew that
Penalty?, GALLUP (Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/14050/who-supports-deathpenalty.aspx.
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failing to repeal the death penalty would force them to cut spending on
other programs. At the same time, state legislators are aware that
executions are extremely rare and can take decades before they occur—if
they occur at all.227 Although it may be difficult to put a price on justice, the
increasingly known problem of wrongful convictions suggests that capital
punishment as it exists today is far from just. Rather, advocates claim, it is
unjust to require taxpayers to put millions of dollars into an inefficient
death penalty system when the money could be better used for more
valuable programs.228 Thus, the question is: considering the millions of
dollars spent on an ineffective death penalty system, is the occasional
execution worth the millions of dollars in taxpayer money? Many state
lawmakers, as well as their residents, answer with a resounding “no.”
The anti-death penalty movement’s recent focus on interestconvergence contrasts sharply with its longstanding emphasis on morality
discussed in Part II. In the past, many advocates endorsed the notion that
capital punishment “is a human rights violation, not just a matter of
criminal justice.”229 Today, anti-death penalty campaigns still focus on the
injustice of the death penalty. In their state abolition campaigns, anti-death
penalty coalitions have highlighted the problem of wrongful convictions
and racial bias in the capital punishment system.230 They have also argued
that the length of the death penalty process harms victims’ families. At the
same time, more and more anti-death penalty organizations now cite cost to
taxpayers as the number one reason, or at least a top reason, why the death
penalty should be abolished.231
The role of interest-convergence has potentially interesting
implications for the future of the anti-death penalty movement. Namely, it
suggests that advocacy groups should continue to focus more on practical
issues, such as cost and inefficiency, in order to end capital punishment in
the rest of the country. Several states, including Oregon and Washington,
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appear to be on the verge of repealing their state death penalty statutes.232
Moreover, most states’ economies have not yet recovered from the 2008
financial crisis.233 Once state legislators and taxpayers no longer feel the
pressure to balance state budgets in a time of financial crisis, the anti-death
penalty movement’s cost argument may lose some of its persuasiveness.
Thus, the window to push for nationwide death penalty reform may be
closing quickly.234
On the other hand, if the economic argument against the death penalty
is so effective, why have some states repealed their death penalty statutes
while others have not? On November 6, 2012, Californian voters rejected
Proposition 34—a ballot initiative to abolish capital punishment in the
state.235 Proposition 34 failed despite the presence of an anti-death penalty
campaign that specifically focused on the high costs and inefficiency of the
state’s death penalty system.236 Between 2008 and 2011, the ACLU
published several reports that revealed the substantial costs of California’s
death penalty.237 The state has only sentenced thirteen convicts to death
since 1978, yet it has spent $4 billion on the death penalty since that
time.238 The failure of Proposition 34 was particularly surprising because of
California’s serious budget crisis,239 which one would think would have
made the anti-death penalty movement’s cost argument particularly
persuasive to voters in the state.
At first blush, California’s failure to pass Proposition 34 appears to
contradict this Note’s argument that interest-convergence can explain the
232
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recent state trend towards abolition of the death penalty. There are several
possible explanations, however, for the result in California. First and
foremost, California’s attempt to abolish the death penalty through a ballot
initiative (as opposed to a statute passed by the state legislature) may be a
key factor in explaining its failure. With the exception of New York, every
state that has abolished the death penalty over the past four decades has
done so through the state legislature.240 California, however, is unique
because its constitution requires a voter referendum to amend the state’s
death penalty statutes.241 Although state legislators are supposed to
represent the interests of their constituents, in reality it takes substantially
fewer resources to educate legislators than to educate the millions of voters
who must vote to change the law. It is particularly time-consuming to
educate individuals about the costs of the death penalty because the idea
that capital punishment costs more than life imprisonment does not
intuitively resonate with most people.242
Evidence suggests that Proposition 34 was unsuccessful because the
anti-death penalty campaign failed to educate enough California voters
about the high costs of the state’s capital punishment system. According to
SAFE California, the organization that led the Proposition 34 campaign, a
lack of funding prevented the campaign from getting the cost message out
to voters.243 The campaign only raised $7.5 million, which it largely spent
on 30-second TV advertisements about wrongful convictions. Although
SAFE California highlighted the cost argument in its radio and Internet
campaigns, TV advertisements are crucial to the success of California
political campaigns.244
Polls conducted in California within the past two years confirm SAFE
California’s belief that many California voters were unaware of the high
costs of the state’s death penalty system when they voted against
Proposition 34. A poll conducted by University of California, Berkeley,
and the Field Poll shortly before Election Day showed that 42% of
California voters were in favor of Proposition 34, while 45% opposed the
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measure.245 However, the poll did not inform respondents about the cost
savings that would result from the initiative.246 In fact, in a 2011 California
Field Poll, the majority of respondents stated that they believed the death
penalty was cheaper than life in prison without parole (43% to 41%).247 In
contrast, a poll conducted by David Binder Research in 2011 shows that
when California voters were informed about the costs, the number of
California voters in support of the death penalty dropped dramatically.248
Specifically, the poll found that 63% of California voters favored life in
prison without parole over the death penalty when they were told that it
would save the state $1 billion in five years and the money saved would go
towards law enforcement and public education.249
Regardless, the failure of Proposition 34 should not be viewed as
signaling a failure of the cost argument or the anti-death penalty movement
in general. The number of Californians who voted for Proposition 34—
48%—was a milestone for California’s anti-death penalty movement.250
Over the past several decades, polls indicated that an overwhelming
number of California voters supported capital punishment, and California
lawmakers generally believed that voicing disapproval of the death penalty
was a “high risk-venture” for their political careers.251 Now, after
Proposition 34 confirmed that public support for capital punishment is
declining, elected officials in California may be more willing to support
repealing the death penalty.
It is also important to note that the unique history of the death penalty
in each state may influence whether the cost argument is effective in
achieving repeal legislation. For instance, while New Jersey, Connecticut,
and New Mexico had not executed anyone in the decades preceding the
abolition of the death penalty in their respective states, other states, namely
Texas and Alabama, continue to execute people every year.252 Residents of
Texas and Alabama may therefore see more value in the death penalty than
245
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residents of other states, and it may be more difficult to convince them that
capital punishment is a waste of taxpayer dollars. In addition, the fact that
some states are more cash-strapped than others also may account for the
varying success of the cost argument. For instance, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Illinois, and Connecticut all faced extremely high budget deficits
when their legislatures voted to abolish the death penalty.253
It is also possible that some state lawmakers are opposed to
considering cost as part of the death penalty debate. Some lawmakers have
argued that the decision of whether to administer the death penalty is
strictly a moral—and not economic—issue.254 On an abstract level, this
argument has merit: the cost argument would be inappropriate in the
context of a flawless death penalty system where states have abundant
resources. The country’s capital sentencing process, however, is fraught
with errors. In addition, there is no penological reason why capital
punishment is more effective than life without parole.255 Lastly, the death
penalty deprives states of other important crime-control programs because
it demands so much money. For these reasons, policymakers must consider
the costs of the death penalty to fulfill their duties to the people of their
state.256
Evidence shows that the cost argument is working in many states, in
spite of a few roadblocks. Accordingly, anti-death penalty advocates should
continue to create an interest-convergence story by focusing on the high
costs of capital punishment. Combined with evidence of wrongful
convictions, the cost argument shows that the abolition of the death penalty
is in the states’ best fiscal interests. At the same time, anti-death penalty
advocates should not completely ignore the moral quandaries involved in
the death penalty. Instead, they should continue to argue that the money
spent on the death penalty should go towards victim assistance and other
critical law enforcement needs. Lastly, the anti-death penalty movement
should continue to educate the public about the inefficiencies and costs of
capital punishment. Considering state lawmakers’ strong interest in
winning reelection, they will only vote to repeal the death penalty if they
think their constituents support such legislation.
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CONCLUSION
In his concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees, Justice Stevens opined,
“The time for a dispassionate, impartial comparison of the enormous costs
that death penalty litigation imposes on society with the benefits that it
produces has surely arrived.”257 Fortunately for Justice Stevens, a focus on
the costs of the death penalty has arrived because the anti-death penalty
movement helped bring the issue to the public’s attention. By creating an
interest-convergence story, anti-death penalty advocates have finally turned
the tide in the movement towards ending the death penalty in the United
States. By emphasizing the costs and inefficiencies of capital punishment,
advocates have helped convince state lawmakers that ending the death
penalty is in the states’ best interests, especially considering the recent
economic crisis. Although the cost argument has not been a “magic bullet”
for ending the death penalty in America, it has proven more successful than
any of the moral arguments that the anti-death penalty movement has used
in the past. This interest-convergence story has implications for the future
of the anti-death penalty movement because it suggests that anti-death
penalty advocates should continue to focus their strategy on an economicbased approach, at least while states’ budget woes persist. It also has
implications for social movements in general. Activists generally attempt to
create social change by concentrating on the moral and humanitarian need
for reform. The anti-death penalty movement’s recent success, however,
suggests that appealing to policymakers’ own interests may prove a more
fruitful strategy in the end.
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